TEPCO released their recordings of inner conferences to the media on August 6, 2012 after the accident in March 2012. However, the released recordings only includes 150 hours of conferences within 2-3 days after the accident. Additionally, voices and sounds are eliminated in those 100 hours of the recordings at Fukushima Daini Plant. The journalists have been also critical to the TEPCO's claim to forbid the general media to record the master tape of the TEPCO's official recordings.
The recordings include 50 hours from March 12, 2011 to March 15 at TEPCO's main office, and 100 hours from March 11 to March 14 at Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant. However, the recordings of Fukushima Daini power plant does not contain any voices or sounds. TEPCO claimed to forbid the general media to copy the recordings and to report the private names of the TEPCO workers. Although these claims have been criticized by numbers of journalists, TEPCO maintained their decision is based on their perspective of the management of private information.
Our Planet TV 06, 08, 2012
From the released recordings, it can be observed that TEPCO did not inform the situation of the crippling Fukushima nuclear plants immediately, but spent long time on making a suitable story to their failure of management. The conversation at the conference held immediately after the explosion of Fukushima Unit 3 on March 14, 2011 seems to show a typical example of how those announcements set by TEPCO are doubtful...
- Takahashi, Technical fellow: I'm not sure if the explosion of Fukushima Unit 3 is a hydrogen explosion, but I think we should announce it a hydrogen explosion because Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said so.
Komori, Executive director: Did we mention "steam"?
- Takahashi: NISA said it was a hydrogen explosion on TV so we should do the same.
- TEPCO Worker 1: Can we announce it a hydrogen explosion, sir?
- TEPCO Worker 2: Actually, the Prime Minister also mentioned hydrogen explosion.
- Shimizu, President: That's right. We should do the same, and let's just decide and announce it quickly.
- Ishizaki, Exusecutive: Don't we need to add the phrase "the condition of the reactor is still stable"?
- Shimizu: yes, you are right.
Despite the fact that these TEPCO executives discussed about the necessity of informing the Prime Minister and residents in Fukushima of the changes in the wind direction from North-East to South-West, this information does not appear in their announcement. Without investigating on the explosion of Fukushima Unit 3, TEPCO executives pushed forward their announcement to avoid a friction. These recordings consistently imply the TEPCO's irresponsible attitude. There is another conversation about the planned blackouts...
- Fujimoto: Vice-president: The government refused our plan of blackout from tomorrow 6:20 p.m. Edano, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Fukuyama, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary and Renho, Minister of State for Consumer Affairs and Food Safety, told me that 'you are going to kill those who set their artificial respirator and a heart‐lung machine at home. We are going to blame you for a murder if you carry on this planned blackouts with knowing the conditions of these patients.'
Fujimoto, Vice-president, reported his proposal for a planned blackout was rejected by the government since the health care center had not finished informing those households with artificial respirators. After he made a report, he continues...
- Fujimoto: We are not going to announce that tomorrow's planned blackout is canceled. If we announce the suspension of the blackout, people will be confused. So I talked to Mr. Shimizu, the President, and decided not to announce it.
- TEPCO worker 1: We should just announce that 'although we were going to undertake a blackout, we decided not to because the power demand started to fall.
- TEPCO worker 2: Sure, I will give a business-like explanation and make up a suitable excuse at the press conference, rather than saying our plan was rejected by the government.
Our Planet TV 08, 08, 2012
Hiroaki Koide, a lecturer of Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute, commented on August 8 on Tanemaki Journal, an online radio broadcast, that 'watching how workers are trying to recover the crippling nuclear power is more important, rather than listening to what the executives of TEPCO talk about the solutions at their conference office. During the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the members of Nuclear Regulatory Committee visited the nuclear plant and made decisions. Haruki Madarame, the head of Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Committee, on the other hand stayed at parliament and never visited Fukushima nuclear power plant, which created a rigid decision making system and misled the recovery process as a consequence.'
Tanemaki Journal 08, 08, 2012